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I 
Not Guilty by Reason of Victimization 
If you put a dog in a cage, and keep 
poking him with a stick, sooner or later 
he's going to bite you. 
-George JacKson, author of 
Soledad Brothers: The Prison 
Letters of George Jackson 
On October 26, 1991, 17 -year-old 
Felicia Morgan and two teenage friends 
went on what the press termed a 
"crimes of fashion" spree in downtown 
Milwaukee. With guns in hand they 
walked up to people on the street and 
took clothes, jewelry, and shoes. When 
17-year-old Brenda Adams tried to run 
away rather than give up the new patch-
work leather coat she'd gotten for her 
birthday, Felicia Morgan shot her dead. 
Felicia's lawyer, Milwaukee criminal 
defense attorney Robin Shellow, put on 
expert testimony to support a Post Trau-
matic Stress Disorder (PTSD) defense. 
Shellow tried to convince the jury that 
Felicia suffered from an urban combat-
induced traumatic stress reaction, 
resulting from her life-long exposure to 
intrafamily and community violence. 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD}I 
is a phenomenon named by psychia-
trists to describe the physical and emo-
tional behavior patterns of trauma 
I PTSD has been formall~' recognized by the 
American Psychiatric Association and listed 
in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM) since 1980. The 
DSM (the Bible of psychiatric diagnoses) is 
currently being re\'ised for a fourth edition. 
DSM-IV. As part of the process of revising 
it. a sub-workgroup of APA members has re-
cently published a book. Post Trallllllltic 
Stress· Disorder: DSM-IV Alld 8ey()/ul. 
American Psychiatric Press. Inc.; (Davidson 
.lOd Foa, ed .. 1993). While this publication 
does not present the official position of the 
DSM-IV Task Force. which is responsible 
fur revising the DSM. it gi\'es a good indica-
tion of the more inclusi\'e definition of 
PTSD that will be included in DSM-IV. 
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survivors: survivors of the kind of 
trauma that is considered outside the 
range of ordinary human experience. 
When use of the term first became 
popular in the late 1970s, it was most 
commonly associated with Vietnam 
veterans and their combat-induced be-
havioral disorders.2 The APA and the 
psychiatric community have now recog-
nized that PTSD also describes the be-
havior of people who have survived a 
variety of other traumatic experiences. 
and that there are links between trau-
matic victimization and subsequent 
anti-social behavior.3 
Events that may result in PTSD in 
children include: exposure to violence 
and/or sexual abuse (intra-family and/or 
in the child's immediate community). 
exposure to war. and the occurrence of 
natural disasters (fires. floods. Three 
Mile Island. etc.).' Sometimes PTSD is 
triggered by one horrific event; some-
times by chronic abuse. Not every ex-
posure to a traumatic event results in 
PTSD. and not every person diagnosed 
as suffering from PTSD exhibits all the 
same symptoms. 
Dr. James Garbarino. a Chicago spe-
cialist on the effects of violence on chil-
dren and one of the expert witnesses in 
2 See People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006 
(re\'ersible error to exclude penalty phase 
defense expert testimon~' re possibility that 
Lucero suffered from PTSD as result of 
service in Vietnam war). and People \'. 
Bruhn (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1195 (Lucero 
had served combat duty in Vietnam. Court 
ordered case remanded for resentencing 
directing trial court to consider federal 
commitment for Lucero-per PC 1170.9-
and exercise discretion.) 
J PTSD: DSM-IV AND BEYOND. supra; HERMAN. 
1., TRAUMA AND RECOVERY, Basil' Books 
(1992); Kaser-Boyd, N., Post-Trallllllltic 
Stress Disorders ill Childrell al/{I Adults: The 
I,egal Rele\'(/Il('e (WESTERN STATES LAW 
REVIEW, publication forthcoming). 
4 PTSD: DSM-IV AND BEYOND, supra at xi. 
Felicia Morgan's case, describes cons. 
tant exposure to a cui ture of violence as 
akin to growing up in chronic combat.s 
Whatever the type of trauma, PTSD 
symptoms may include increased ago 
gression, abnormally quick responses of 
rage, and episodes in which the sufferer 
acts without control while reliving a 
traumatic experience.6 
Felicia Morgan was beaten and threa. 
tened at gun and knife point by her 
mother throughout her childhood. The 
landlord raped her when she was 11. 
Later she was molested by her mother's 
boyfriend. Felicia often witnessed gun. 
fights among family members, includ· 
ing seeing her mother shoot at both her 
father and the boyfriend. Two of her un· 
cles were murdered two days apart. 
Felicia was present at the violent deaths l 
of several other relatives and friends. 
When a psychologist asked Felicia how 
she had managed to stay alive, she said: ( 
"My ears be open, even when I'm 
asleep."? Shellow described her client's 
mental condition as a borderline per· 
sonality disorder resulting from the 
cumulative effects of the violence in her 
life. According to Shellow, her client 
wasn't crazy "because she lived in a bad 
neighborhood, because she was poor, or 
because she was black ... , she became 
crazy in order to survive."B 
The jury found Felicia Morgan guilty 
5 Dr. Garbarino contends that tens of thou' 
sands of inner-city children probably suffer 
not only from PTSD, but also frolll a loss of 
faith i~ adults and in the future. Woo. 1. 
Urball Trauma Mitigates Gllilt. Defei/ders 
Sa\', The Wall Street 10urnal. 4/27/93. 
• TH'E AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION DIAG-
NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAl. 
DISORDERS, 3rd Ed., Revised (DSM·!II·R) 
1987. 
7 Woo, supra. The Wall Street Journal. 
4/27/93. 
8 Flaherty, The Ghel/o MildI' Me Do II. I~ 
THESE TIMES at 19 (AprilS, 1993). 
~ 
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of first degree murder. In the second 
phase of the trial, the same jury rejected 
her insanity defense-but in the end, the 
judge, who had heard months of tes-
timony about the horrors that made up 
Felicia's life, sentenced her to the abso-
lute minimum amount of prison time. 
She will be parole eligible in 13 years.9 
Over representation of PTSD 
Sufferers Among Criminal 
Defendants 
PTSD is now understood to be "a 
problem of substantial magnitude in the 
general population." According to a 
1991 study, 4 out of to Americans have 
experienced major trauma, and the dis-
I order itself may be present in 9% of the 
population. lo 
I Criminal defense lawyers have long 
I known intuitively that PTSD survivors 
like Felicia Morgan are enormously 
I overrepresented among our clients. For 
I many of our clients, born and raised 
I amid incredible violence, this prolonged 
I exposure (as victim and witness) may 
j 
result in the form of PTSD that Felicia 
Morgan's lawyer described as "Urban 
Psychosis."11 
The publicity surrounding Califor-
nia's most recent executions has 
" 
brought similar horrifying life stories of 
death row inmates to the front page of 
lour collective consciousness, and has 
, helped make the link between early vic-
j timization and later perpetrat;on pain-
I fully clear. The two men executed by the 
: State within the last two years, Robert 
j Alton Harris (the product of both Fetal I Moohol Syncleom'" and a viol,nt ,hild-
I 
! 'Telephone conversation with Robin 
I· Shellow. 
1
10 P!~D: DSM-IV AND BEYOND, supra at xi, lx, 
CIting Breslau ct al. 1991). 
11 Dr. Judith Herman has referred to this 
more complex form of PTSD as Disorder of 
Extreme Stress Not Otherwise Specified 
(DESNOS), which is currently under con-
sideration for inclusion in DSM-IV. She 
SUggests that prolonged and repeated ex-
Posure to trauma causes pathological 
changes in behavior and personality. PTSD: 
I DSM-IV AND BEYOND, supra, Chapter 12. 
; 12 Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) is defined as 
I a chemical imbalance in the fetus caused 
. by excessive drinking by the mother, and 
affecting the central nervous system of the 
developing fetus, manifest in a cluster of 
t-' · Vol. 20, No.4 
s T A T E o 
hood), and David Mason (beaten and hu-
miliated as a child, violent and suicidal 
as an adult), are both examples of 
people who grew up to do unto others 
some version of what was done to them 
as children. 
Recent studies of death row prisoners 
indicate that, in addition to (or as a 
result of) shared histories of child 
abuse, many of the prisoners also suffer 
from brain damage. The root cause of 
the neurological damage may be Fetal 
Alcohol Syndrome, or severe head in-
jury, or both, but the results are similar: 
scars in the parts of the brain that affect 
judgment and the ability to control rage 
and other emotions. Although certainly 
not every victim becomes a perpetrator, 
a brain-damaged child raised in an at-
mosphere of chronic violence is a likely 
candidate for socially unacceptable be-
havior. 13 
As criminal defense lawyers we are 
privy to our clients' psycho-social histo-
ries in a way that others in the system 
are not. We have a responsibility to 
educate judges and juries about the rele-
vance of traumatic events to the forma-
tion of specific in ten t, and to the 
significance of PTSD as a factor in miti-
gation at sentencing. 14 We do much 
more for our clients if we can bring this 
information to light early on, as part of 
our representation of first-time offen-
ders. While the PTSD defense has been 
employed almost exclusively in homi-
cide cases, we must not hold this 
symptoms and subtle physical characteris-
tics sometimes difficult to detect, including 
difficulty in telling right from wrong and 
understanding the consequences of be-
havior, and poor judgment. 
According to the National Council on Al-
coholism, an estimated 5,000 children-one 
in every 750-are born each year with FAS. 
JJ A study of 15 death row inmates, conducted 
by Dorothy Otnow Lewis, a professor of 
Psychiatry at New York University School 
of Medicine, revealed that all 15 had evi-
dence of severe head injury and 12 showed 
evidence of neurological problems, ranging, 
from blackouts to amnesia, as well. (Lori 
Olszewski, New Theory About What Makes 
a Murderer: Child Abuse Plus Brain Inju-
ries, San Francisco Chronicle, 8/12/93 A-I, 
A-12.) 
14 In the case or Lyle and Erik Menendez, on 
trial in Los Angeles at the time this article 
is being written, the two brothers are ac-
E F E N s E s 
Susan Rutberg, formerly a deputy public 
defender in San Francisco, is now an Associ-
ate Professor at Golden Gate University 
School of Law. She is a board member of 
Women Defenders. 
defense in reserve until a client's men-
tal state has degenerated to the point 
where they face the most serious crime. 
This article is written to help defense 
lawyers focus on this most critical 
defense early enough in our clients' lives 
to offer them real help. 
cused of killing their parents. Defense law-
yer Leslie Abramson tried to introduce evi-
dence of the brothers' molestation and 
abuse to support their claim of self-
defense. Initially, Superior Court Judge 
Stanley Weisberg refused to let the jury 
hear it, saying: "I think this whole issue is 
being blown out of proportion ... that 
somehow there's a linkage between the 
molestation, if there was one, and the kill-
ings. It doesn't prove anything." Abram-
son's response is indicative of the gap in 
the perspectives, the parallel universes in-
habited by bench and bar on this issue: "It 
does not surprise me to hear the court say 
that. It horrifies me, but it doesn't surprise 
me .... We can't get him (Judge Weisberg) 
to broaden his view of what the evidence is 
in this case, and I can't understand it." (Par-
ents' Shooting, Family Secrets: Court 
Weighs Whether Sex Abuse Bears on Sons' 
GlIilt, San Francisco Examiner 8/22/93 B-6, 
col.!.) 
Eventually the defense succeeded in per-
suading the judge to admit evidence of the 
defendants' childhood abuse. 
37 
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Effects of PTSD 
The impact on most organisms that 
live with long-term stress is biological 
change and eventual breakdown. ls In 
humans, acute or chronic stress pro-
duces both a biological response and an 
emotional response. Psychiatrists be-
lieve that if the trauma (or stressor) is 
significant enough to create the threat 
of death, or the perception that the vic-
tim might die, the person's sense of 
safety in the world may be unalterably 
affected. Long after the traumatic event 
is over, PTSD survivors live with an en-
hanced sense of threat as well as im-
paired impulse control, and difficulty in 
controlling strong emotions. The mind 
and body's struggle to recover from 
trauma often produces a constriction of 
the personality, a dampening down of 
emotions, and an attempt to forget or 
repress the traumatic memories. A 
resurgence of all the original feelings 
can and often does come with a stimu-
lus, most likely in the form of a similar 
event that triggers the repressed 
memories and feelings produced by the 
original event. 16 
General conditions that seem to hold 
true for people reacting to acute or 
chronic traumatic stress include: pro-
tracted depression, avoidance of 
thoughts or feelings associated with the 
trauma, inability to recall important 
aspects of .the trauma, feelings of 
detachment or estrangement, sleep 
problems, restlessness, withdrawal, 
hyperstartle, hypervigilance, confusion, 
paranoia, overwhelming fear, a re-
stricted range of affect, and a sense of a 
foreshortened futureP 
Helping our clients unlock these 
memories can provide support for 
defenses to crimes or explanations in 
mitigation of criminal behavior by ex-
15 SELYE, H., THE PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY 
OF EXPOSURE TO STRESS (1950), Montreal: 
ACTA, Inc. 
16 Kaser-Boyd, N., Balash, S., Battered 
Woman Syndrome and Other Subtypes of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Strengths 
and Liabilities in the Courtroom 19 CACJ 
FORUM 4 (1992). 
17 PTSD: DSM-IV AND BEYOND, supra, at 75. 
Felicia Morgan's survival mechanism: "My 
ears be wide open, even when I'm asleep," 
supra, is an example of the hypervigilance 
common in PTSD survivors. 
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plaining how events surrounding the 
charged crime triggered reliving the 
original trauma. 
When we want mental state 
evidence admitted, 
what do we argue? 
1. Relevance: Raising a Reasonable 
Doubt on Mental State 
Due process requires that every crimi-
nal defendant be afforded the opportu-
nity to have evidence of his/her state of 
mind (also known as relevant mental 
condition) placed before the jury. If this 
kind of evidence is excluded, the right to 
present an effective defense is im-
periled. (Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 
U.S. 284 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 
388 U_S. 14 (1967).) The California Legis-
lature purported to abolish the "dimin-
ished capacity" defense in 1981, yet 
evidence of mental impairment and/or 
intoxication may still be offered on the 
issue of whether the defendant actually 
formed a required specific intent, or 
mental state. (Penal Code sections 22, 
28.)'8 
In fact, the Legislature may not deny 
a defendant the opportunity to disprove 
a requisite mental state. People v. Bobo 
(1990) 229 Cal.App.3d 1417, 1442. A 
defendant retains the 14th Amendment 
due process right to present evidence 
on, and have the jury determine, any 
18 In 1978, former San Francisco Supervisor 
Dan White shot and killed then-Mayor 
George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey 
Milk. The killings occurred in San Fran-
cisco City Hall during business hours, and 
the defendant, a former San Francisco fire-
man and friend of many San Francisco 
police officers, surrendered. The sym-
pathetic police detectives conducting 
White's post-surrender interrogation asked 
him to "tell us about the pressures you've 
been under lately .... " White's lawyers 
offered psychiatric testimony focusing on 
White's state of mind. The expert testified 
about the effect of a super-junk food diet 
on an already overstressed mind. This 
"Twinkie" defense was ridiculed in the 
press, but the jury found it persuasive. 
White's later acquittal of murder (he was 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter in-
stead), resulted in mass demonstrations 
and public outcry. The Legislature re-
sponded by trying to close the door on men-
tal defenses falling somewhere short of 
insanity. The new Penal Code sections 
substituted "diminished actuality" for 
E F E N T S 1 PI 
issue which negates a mental element of 
the charge. 19 
Battered women have paved the Way 
for the introduction of evidence of Past 
mistreatment as a way to shed light on 
the issue of intent in the charged crillle 
Responding to articulate advocates fa; 
battered women, the Legislature relaxed 
the rules for admission of expert tes-
timony on Battered Women's Syndrollle 
(BWS).20 New Evidence Code section 
1107, enacted in 1991, makes expert tes-
timony on BWS generally admissible.21 


















te "diminished capacity." Hence, since 1981 
defense lawyers trying to bring in evidenc~ l cc 
about their clients' mental state have had W 
to show that it is relevant to whether or not I 
their clients actually formed the requisite se 
intent. m 
19 See, Tom Lundy, Adventures in the Wonder- .. ! m 
land of Specific Intent, 20 CACJ FORUM 2 th 
t·. UI (1993). 
20 "Battered Woman Syndrome" (BWS) is a Ii 
term used to describe the behavioral pat-
terns of women who have been the victims 
of violence perpetrated by their partners, 
and who have remained in the relationship 
after repeated violent incidents. Offered to 
explain how a woman's particular ex-
periences affect her perceptions of danger 
and her honest belief in its imminence, 
BWS evidence has become increasingly ac-
cepted in the courts. The dynamic is gener-
ally described as a cycle of violence 
involving three phases: tension building, an 
acute battering incident, and a tranquil 
period of (often) loving contrition. Some 
victims of BWS exhibit a condition known 
as "learned helplessness" which causes dis-
torted behavior-passivity and compliance 
rather than resistance or attempts to es-
cape. Overwhelming fear that the batterer 
will kill them (or their children) if they at-
tempt to leave is another factor in the be· 
havior of women who suffer from BWS. 
For further information, see: WALKER, LE-
NORE, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); THE BAT-













LOVE (1989); Maguigan, Battered Women , 
and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconcep· 
tions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. 
PA. L. REV. 379 (1991); Murphy, Assisting Ihe 
Jury in Understanding Victimization: Ex-
pert Psychological Testimony on Bat/ered 
Woman Syndrome and Rape Trauma syn-
drome, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 277 
(1992); Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and 
Women: Heat of Passion Manslallghlerand 
Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L.REV. 
1679 (1986). 
21 CACJ was instrumental in ensuring pas-
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"Y I, 
)f I tirnony is admissible by either the I prosecution or the defense, regarding 
, battered women's syndrome, including 
Iy I 5t the physical, emotional, or mental ef-i fects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or 
e. behavior of victims of domestic vio-
lr lienee, except when offered against a 
:d criminal defendant to prove the occur-













I form the basis of the criminal charge." 
, section (b) of the new statute describes 
1 the minimal foundation required: the 
proponent must simply establish 
relevancy and properly qualify the ex-
pert witness. The section goes on to 
'1 state: "Expert opinion testimony on bat-
tered women's syndrome shall not be 
1 considered a new scientific technique 
whose reliability is unproven." 
I Two recent battered women cases 
1 seem to indicate a judicial willingness to 
make the link between past mistreat-
I ment and mental state that the judge in 
,2 11 the Menendez case found so difficult to 




! tigate the possibility that a client suffered from battered woman syn-
i drome, and thus to offer the evidence at 
'S, 'I trial, resulted in reversaL People v. Day jp 
to (1992) 2 CaLApp.4th 405; and People v. 
'x' Romero (1992) 15 Cal.AppAth 1519, 
I
' rev. granted -- Cal.4th --, 17 
















1 In People v. Day, supra the Court 
l found reversible error in defense coun-
1 sel's failure to offer evidence of BWS to 
'j'rebut the prosecutor's impeaching 
cross-examination of the defendant. Day 
1 claimed self-defense: during cross-
I
' examination, the prosecutor raised the 
inference that her conduct before and 
I 
j 
j 'C;;de section 1107. Former CAC) President 
1 
Leslie Abramson helped draft it, and legis· 
.... lative advocate Melissa Nappan lobbied for 
, its passage. 
A bill co-authored by State Senator 
W I Killea and Assembly Member Moore, 
U. J proposing a change in the definition of 
en 
he I voluntary manslaughter in domestic vio, 
~x- Ilence cases, came within one vote of pas-
'ed .' sage in the Legislature this past session. 
,rI- Senate Bill 1144 would have provided that 
:~ 'Il the jury or court is entitled to infer an 
honest but unreasonable belief in the ;: l necessity to resort to selr·defense if the 
defendant has both been subjected to a his· 
alc~: .1' tory or pattern of repeated abuse or domes· 
~ ~ic violence by the decedent, and was in an 
Intimate relationship with the decedent. 
1M. '. 4:;..' · Vol. 20. No.4 
I .cr ,', 
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after the incident was inconsistent with 
that defense_ "Had evidence of the BWS 
been introduced, he (defense counsel) ef-
fectively could have countered the bat-
tered woman myths on which the 
prosecutor built his case .... BWS evi-
dence would have bolstered appellant's 
credibility, and lent credence to her self-
defense claim." (Day, supra at 420). 
An earlier case, predating the changes 
to Evidence Code section 1107, opened 
the door for the introduction of expert 
testimony re BWS. People v. Aris (1989) 
215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1196 held that such 
expert testimony was admissible, 
although for limited purposes, when 
offered by the defendant to support a 
claim that she assaulted or killed her 
abusive husband in self-defense. The 
court found that the proffered BWS evi-
dence was not admissible to prove the 
objective reasonableness of D's claimed 
self-defense. However, it also held that 
it was error (albeit harmless) to exclude 
expert testimony regarding BWS, to the 
extent defendant's particular ex-
periences affected her perceptions of 
danger and its imminence.22 
People v. Romero, supra, which was 
not a domestic violence case per se, is 
particularly noteworthy for defense 
lawyers needing arguments to support 
the notion that a client's history of 
abuse is relevant to alleged criminal be-
havior. Debra and Terrance Romero 
were jointly charged with robbery and 
attempted robbery, and Debra's defense 
was duress. Although her trial lawyer 
recognized the possibility that Debra 
Romero suffered from BWS and made 
some inquiries about finding an expert 
witness to conduct an evaluation, that is 
as far as he went. The court found that 
counsel's failure to investigate was 
unreasonable. Even though Debra 
Romero's case went to trial before the 
Legislature added section 1107 to the 
22 Brenda Aris was granted clemency by 
Governor Wilson on May 28, 1993. Prof. 
Kathleen (Cookie) Ridolfi, Santa Clara 
University Law School and the California 
Coalition for Battered Women in Prison 
represented Ms. Aris. See also, Ridolfi's 
response to Governor Wilson's limited 
grants of clemency: Governor Improperly 
Restricted Use of Pardoning Power, CALIFOR-
NIA STATE BAR BULLETIN, 7/28/93, at I. 
E F E N s E s 
Evidence Code, the court still found it 
would have been reasonable to expect a 
criminal defense lawyer to recognize the 
applicability of BWS evidence to a 
duress defense. Romero, supra at 1162, 
fn.11. 
Romero makes clear that despite limi-
tations on the scope of allowable mental 
defenses, counsel still has the obligation 
to undertake "careful factual and legal 
investigations and inquiries with a view 
to developing matters of defense in 
order that he (sic) may make informed 
decisions on his (sic) client's behalf ... 
(citation omitted). If as a result of his 
(sic) failure to undertake a careful in-
quiry and investigation a crucial de-
fense is withdrawn from the case, the 
defendant has not had the assistance of 
counsel to which she is entitled." (People 
v. Romero, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th 1150, 
1162, quoting People v. Shells (1971) 4 
Ca1.3d 626, 630 and People v. Ibarra 
(1963) 60 Cal.2d 460, 464.) 
2. A Variety of Theories 
When you are seeking admission of 
expert testimony on some syndrome or 
mental state other than battered woman 
syndrome, you will still have to con-
vince the judge of the nexus between 
your client's story and the lack of the 
requisite mental state. Traditionally, ex-
pert testimony is deemed relevant if it 
will be of assistance to the jury in decid-
ing the facts of the case. "If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise" (Federal Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 702) If the witness is qualified, and 
the subject is "sufficiently beyond a 
common experience" that hearing the 
witness's testimony would assist the 
trier of fact in understanding the evi-
dence or in determining a fact in issue, 
then the testimony should be admitted. 
(Evidence Code sections 720, 801). The 
California Supreme Court has "inter-
preted this language to require exclu-
sion of expert opinion 'only when it 
would add nothing at all to the jury's 
common fund of information .... " (Peo-
plev. Stoll(1989)49Ca1.3d 1136, 1154, 
quoting People v. McDonald (1984) 37 
Ca1.3d 351,367.) 
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the Legislature has specifically sanc-
tioned admission of expert testimony, 
defense counsel should consider a vari-
ety of theories for connecting the expert 
testimony to the mental state in issue. 
First, counsel might argue by analogy 
to Evidence Code section 1107 that if the 
defendant has been a victim of repeated 
abuse, PTSD would be admissible to 
show, in the vernacular of section 1107, 
its "effects upon the beliefs, perceptions 
or behavior of victims" of such violence. 
The Legislature has acknowledged the 
relevance of this expert testimony to 
one class of defendant; there is no prin-
cipled reason to restrict the evidence to 
that group of defendants. 23 
Second, defense counsel should con-
sider employing established defenses 
such as unconsciousness in the PTSD 
context. See e.g., People v. Wu (1991) 235 
Cal.App.3d 614, a case in which a 
mother was charged with the murder of 
her child. Trial counsel introduced tes-
timony showing that at the time of the 
killing the mother's extreme emotional 
and psychological distress brought on a 
fugue state. The trial court refused a re-
quested instruction on the defense of 
unconsciousness. The Court of Appeal 
reversed, holding that there was suffi-
cient evidence to support the instruc-
tion. Predictably, Wu was depublished; 
23 Defendants other than battered women 
may be able to argue that Evidence Code 
section 1107 permits them to introduce ex-
pert testimony like BWS. Section 1107 per-
mits testimony regarding the effects of 
BWS on "victims of domestic violence." 
The statute defines "domestic violence" by 
reference to section 542 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure (Domestic Violence Protection 
Act). That section defines domestic violence 
as abuse perpetrated against "any of the 
following: (I) A spouse, former spouse, co-
habitant, former cohabitant, any other 
adult person related by consanguinity or 
affinity within the second degree, or a per-
son with whom the respondent has had a 
dating or engagement relationship. (2) A 
person who is the parent of a child .... " 
Moreover, defendants may have a claim 
that limiting BWS-type mental evidence to 
the class of battered women would deprive 
other similarly situated defendants of the 
equal protection of the laws. A cohabitant 
should likewise be able to present expert 
testimony to explain the effects of their 
particular mental condition on criminal 
intent. 
40 
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but the authority upon which it relied 
remains good law supporting a defense 
of unconsciousness where the psycho-
logical forces acting on defendant are so 
severe as to produce action without 
awareness. See e.g., People v. Wilson 
(1967) 66 Cal.2d 749; People v. Moore 
(1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 486. See CAUIC No. 
4.30.)24 
Expert testimony negating the infer-
ence of a predisposition to commit the 
charged crimes may be admissible as 
character evidence. Refusal to permit 
"Anti-Syndrome" evidence in a prosecu-
tion for lewd and lascivious acts against 
a child may result in reversal. In People 
v. Stoll, supra, child molestation convic-
tions were reversed due to the trial 
court's prejudicial exclusion of defen-
dant's proffered evidence of psycholo-
gist's opinion that he showed no signs of 
"deviance" or "abnormality." The court 
held the evidence was relevant to the 
defendant's claims that the charged acts 
did not occur, the psychologist's qualifi-
cations were well established, and the 
testimony would have been proper char-
acter evidence. 
An approach to interviewing 25 
Part of the problem in figuring out 
how to get relevant mental state evi-
dence admitted is overcoming clients' 
resistance to talking about traumatic 
events. Clients suffering from some 
form of PTSD are unable to tell you so 
directly. Their symptoms (denial, 
depression, substance abuse, etc.) are 
almost all impediments to easy dis-
closure. What survivors of PTSD cannot 
help doing, however, is reveal clues to 
their histories in their interactions with 
you. An awareness of the behavior pat-
24 PTSD may also be relevant to the tradi· 
tional defense of heat of passion, to the ex-
tent that the defendant's "passion" may be 
the product of having been the victim of 
persistent violence. (See People v. Borchers 
(1958) 50 Cal.2d 321 [passion may be rage, 
anger or any other intense emotion].) 
25 Many of the suggestions below are the 
product of a telephone conversation on 
June 10, 1993 with psychologist Kathleen 
Wayland, Duke Medical Center, Dept. of 
Psychiatry, Durham, North Carolina. Dr. 
Wayland's work concentrates on trauma-
tized children and their resultant conduct 
disorders. 
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) 
terns that characterize a PTSD surviVor 
will make it easier for you to recognize 
such clients and respond appropriately. 
Some suggestions borrowed from ther_ 
apists to encourage reluctant patients to 
( 
I 
talk about their histories are: ( 
1. To make it easier to build trust 
identify one person in the defense tea~ 
to play the mental health role-to be the 
client's confidante regarding psycho-
social issues. If you have the resources 
use an experienced psychologist. If not' 
consult with one, read what you can' 
and pay attention to the client's re: 
sponses. 
2. Ask open-ended questions. Listen 
to the client's responses and watch how ) 
s(he) interacts with you. Be careful not I. 
to talk in psychobabble or lawyer-speak. 
Don't label the phenomenon you think I' 
might be present (i.e. "Are you a bat. , 
tered woman? Was your father an alco-
holic?") Try instead to move people to r 
tell their stories in their own ways: "Can [ 
you think of a time when your father 
was angry? Tell me about that time." I 
Ask for more and more detail, as con· 
crete as possible, until you think that 
memory is exhausted. Come back to it [' 
later. 
We know this technique already: we 
learned it the hard way during our first l'. 
few weeks of practice. "Okay, now tell 
me this," you asked in your most law· 
yerly way, "Did you give a statement to 
the police?" "No way," says the client, 
you think I'm stupid?" But when you 
get discovery from the DA, there's a 
detailed, 1O-page, tape-recorded confes· 
sion! That's how we knew to ask it 
differently: "Okay, I want to hear every· 
thing you can remember about getting 
arrested, from the time the cop first 
came up until he left you in the jail 
cell ... and "Then what happened? 
What did the cop first say to you? And 
what did you tell him? ... and did yOU 
ever see him write anything down? Any· 
body else around? What else did he say? 
What else did you say to him?" 
3. Take it slow. Be gentle. Explain the 
concept of confidentiality in easily un' 
derstandable ways. Tell the client why 
you are asking all these prying ques· 
tions. E.g.,: "This is important to me be' 
cause it's part of who you are, and 








0; way to help get you out of this situa' 
tion." Communicate with the client ) "J 
often: keep him/her informed about the I tl 
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4. Once there has been a first men-
tion of some traumatic event or pattern 
I 
of behavior (physical or sexual abuse, 
combat, whatever) then respond suppor-
I tively and tread lightly. Remember that 
for trauma survivors to describe the 
I 
event is sometimes to relive the trauma. 
Lawyers are not therapists. Try to get 
the court to pay for the services of a 
I therapist and/or look for one who is 
, willing to treat your client pro bono. 
I 5. Be careful not to relate to your 
I 
client as a victim, so as not to reinforce 
the negative self-image that often is a 
byproduct of abusive treatment. Surviv-
I ing an attempt at dehumanization is a 
testament to the individual's ability to 
I develop extreme coping mechanisms. 
Being able to talk about a trauma is an 
I 
initial stage of recovery. Therapists call 
it naming or claiming and believe it 
helps the person overcome repeated 
: reliving of the trauma. 
1 6. Investigate your client's back-
ground. Locate all the documents you 
J 
can find: school records; hospital and 
psychiatric records of client and par-
ents; parents' criminal records; police 
1 
reports of domestic violence or sexual 
abuse in the client's home. 
Any corroboration of your client's 
I story serves a dual purpose: it makes 
your defense more real to the court, 
I thus increasing your chances of getting 
j
1 itto the jury, and it provides emotional 
support for the client. When you go to 
i gre~t lengths to find evidence to ~ack.up 
; ac!lent's story, you are commumcatmg 
I a kind of faith that may help give the 
I client the courage to testify. 
j 
jlf We lose admissibility arguments, 
1 how do we respond? Imagine the 
I judge has the nerve to deny a 
, carefully crafted and brilliantly 
) argued motion and offer 
j of proof ... 
! 1. Try again: see if the court will 
i a!low a compromise. Request permis-
I Sion for the expert to testify about the 
1 
defendant's mental condition and about 
any relevant syndromes, such as PTSD 
,generally, or Battered Woman or 
I ~bused Child syndrome specifically. 
,: fomise to refrain from asking for an 
~Pinion that the alleged crime was a 
I 
Product" of the mental condition in 
. this case. Offer an instruction tailored 
, to the facts of your case and the state of 
I J"" · Vol. 20, No. , 
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the law: that "a defendant is not respon-
sible if at the time of his (sic) unlawful 
conduct his (sic) mental or emotional 
processes or behavior controls were im-
paired to such an extent that he (sic) 
cannot justly be held responsible for his 
(sic) act." United States v. Brawner, 471 
F.2d 969, 986 (D.C. Cir.1972 Bazelon, 
c.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). See also CALJIC 9.35.1 (1992) 
cautionary instruction on BWS. 
Offer another instruction to your ex-
pert defining the limitations of her role: 
"As an expert witness, you may, if you 
wish, and if you feel you can, give your 
opinion about whether the defendant 
suffered from a mental disease or de-
fect. You may then explain how defen-
dant's disease or defect relates to his 
alleged offense, that is, how the develop-
ment, adaptation and functioning of 
defendant's behavioral processes may 
have influenced his conduct. This expla-
nation should be so complete that the 
jury will have a basis for an informed 
judgment on whether the alleged crime 
was a 'product' of his mental disease or 
defect. But it will not be necessary for 
you to express an opinion on whether 
the alleged crime was a 'product' of a 
mental disease or defect, and you will 
not be asked to do so .... " (See Judge 
Bazelon's model instruction in Washing-
ton v. U.S. 390 F.2d 444, 457-58 (D.C. Cir. 
1967); 
2. Prepare your client to testify: No 
matter how impressive your expert, 
your client's direct testimony is prob-
ably the best way to communicate 
hislher mental state at the time of the al-
leged crime in the context of hislher life 
story. Working with the client to help 
himlher understand the relationship be-
tween the traumatic events and hislher 
present circumstances may make it eas-
ier for your client to communicate. 
Your ongoing conversations with your 
client, particularly if supplemented by 
therapy, will affect your client's comfort 
level-eliminating some of the flat-
affect, detached quality that creates 
credibility problems for a client who 
suffers from PTSD.26 
3. Become the excluded expert in 
closing argument: Consult with people 
26 There are differing opinions among law-
yers who specialize in defense of battered 
women as to whether the client makes a 
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knowledgeable in the particular syn-
drome. Read whatever you can find. 
Think about factual illustrations, gener-
alizations, studies you can use that con-
nect your client's story to a universally 
understandable story. Think about 
Robert Alton Harris, David Mason and 
Felicia Morgan. 
Why Courts Resist Linking a 
Defendant's Background to 
Specific Intent 
Legal Fictions 
The criminal justice system functions 
more effective witness without therapy. A 
client who chooses not to undergo therapy 
may appear detached and unemotive on the 
witness stand. Some BWS specialists be-
lieve that there is an advantage to having 
the client appear before the jury in this un-
treated state. Rather than forcing therapy 
on an unwilling client, these specialists 
prefer to offer expert testimony to explain 
the connection between their client's 
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on the basis of some fundamental prin-
ciples, strongly espoused, but often 
honored in the breach. These legal fic-
tions include the presumption of inno-
cence: a cornerstone of due process that 
is widely proclaimed, but, inside the 
courthouse, almost universally dis-
believed. Though jurors are still in-
structed to presume a defendant not 
guilty, the judge and prosecutor often 
convey the opposite meaning by their at-
titude toward the defendant. Cynicism 
is contagious: it is not hard for an ob-
server to pick up on the fact that most 
participants in the system presume the 
defendant guilty (at least) as charged. 
Prosecutors often see their job as sim-
ply proving the facts. Although most 
crimes require a union of act and intent, 
intent is generally presumed from the 
(often grisly) facts themselves. Defense 
efforts to focus the court's attention on 
the defendant's background and its ef-
fect on his/her intent to commit the 
crime are discouraged. For many trial 
judges, the only issue is "dig (s)he do it, 
or didn't (s)he?" and, since we know 
s(he) did, "let's get on to sentencing." 
Institutional resistance to letting ju-
ries hear defendants' true-life horror 
stories is easy to understand: the crimi-
nal law is based on two of the biggest 
legal fictions of all: that criminals are 
Evil, and that punishment works to 
deter them from future crimes.27 Tradi-
tional theories of crime and punishment 
teach us that criminals are people ex-
hibiting an innate "vicious will" who, 
when confronted with the choice be-
tween right and wrong, choose freely to 
do wrong. 28 But those of us who 
represent criminal defendants have a 
different point of view: as in Felicia 
Morgan's case, "choice" is rarely the 
word that accurately describes our 
clients' relationship to their actions. 
The criminal justice system has been 
slow to legitimize the connection be-
tween enormously traumatic life events 
or chronic abuse and violent crime be-
cause the system is not equipped to han-
dle it. Evidence that many "criminals" 
are bruised and abused people acting 
out the destinies their families and com-
munities have shaped for them is too 
27 This article only addresses the first of these 
two fictions. 
28 Pound, Roscoe, Introduction to F. SAYRE, 
CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW at xxxvi (1927). 
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threatening to the status quo. 
A defendant's psychosocial history is 
relevant to the ability to form criminal 
intent. Judges and juries need to he~r 
the facts of the case in the context of the 
larger story, the whole story: "What was 
going on here? Who is this person? 
What were his/her options?" 
will have to start by protecting OUr I 
children. 
It is our job to try to bring evidence 
about the forces present in our clients' I. 
mental and physical lives into the COUrt. ( 
room, to fight the court's cynicism, and , 
to tell each client's individual story. We 
need to uncover these stories sooner 
rather than later: if we can bring this 
kind of evidence into the courtroom at 
If we acknowledge the role physical. 
sexual and emotional abuse has in the 
shaping of the psyche, we will have to 
replace our prisons with community 
centers that provide childcare, health 
care, shelter, substance abuse treatment, 
parenting classes and job training. We 
an early stage in a person's antisocial 
development, then we create the possi. 
bility of intervention, and some of these ' 
same clients may not end up on Death 
Row. 0 
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